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Abstract
In Arrows seminal analysis of optimal risk bearing in which he in-
troduced contingent claim securities, he assumed preferences were repre-
sentable by a state independent Expected Utility function. Although the
classic contingent claim setting assumes agents choose over contingent con-
sumption vectors conditioned on a xed set of probabilities, later work on in-
formation economics suggested that allowing probabilities to change across
contingent claim spaces could be an interesting extension. However the set
of axioms that are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an Expected
Utility representation for the classic contingent claim space with a xed set
of probabilities does not ensure that this form utility extends across mul-
tiple contingent claim spaces. In this paper, we derive a set of axioms on
preferences which are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an Ex-
pected Utility representation when probabilities change. We also consider
the incremental axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient for Expected Util-
ity preferences to extend to the classic lottery setting of von Neumann and
Morgenstern, where agents choose not only over consumption vectors but
also over probabilities vectors.
KEYWORDS. Expected utility, contingent claim demand, additive separability,
lottery preferences, contingent claim preferences
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1 Introduction
In the classic Arrow-Debreu contingent claim set up, one typically assumes that
there are a nite number of states and agents possess preferences over state con-
tingent consumption. Arrow (1953) introduced contingent claim securities and
derived conditions such that the allocation of risk-bearing by competitive secu-
rities markets is optimal. To simplify his analysis and derive clear results, he
assumed that preferences are representable by a state independent von Neumann-
Morgenstern Expected Utility function. In Arrows analysis, probabilities are
xed. Over the ensuing two decades, researchers began to consider the case of
changing probabilities as they explored questions of speculation and the acquisi-
tion and value of information (see Rubinstein 1975, Hirshleifer and Riley 1979 for a
classic overview and Schlee 2001 for more a more recent example). This literature
continued to assume that risk preferences are representable by a state independent
Expected Utility function as new information is obtained and probabilities vary.
Arrow, in explicitly citing the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem, e¤ectively
borrowed their result despite the fact that his state contingent claim setting is
quite di¤erent from the lottery setting assumed by von Neumann-Morgenstern
(1953) and Samuelson (1952). The contingent claim setting is based on a xed set
of state probabilities and varying state consumption payo¤s, whereas the lottery
setting assumes arbitrary probability distributions where both probabilities and
consumption payo¤s can vary. Clearly the lottery setting is more general, but
the assumed completeness axiom requiring individuals to have preferences over
the full space of distributions is very strong. Indeed both von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1953, p. 630) and Aumann (1962) argue that the completeness
axiom is of "dubious validity".
Thus, it would seem desirable to develop an alternative set of axioms tailored
to the narrower contingent claim choice space. This new set of axioms needs to
accommodate the fact that the latter space, unlike the former, is not a mixture
space.1 Werner (2005) (building on Hens 1992) derived such a set of axioms which
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1For example since the set of contingent claim distributions is not a mixture space, one can
not assume the Strong Independence Axiom which is central to the von Neumann-Morgenstern
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are necessary and su¢ cient for preferences to be representable by a state indepen-
dent Expected Utility function. He followed the classic contingent claim set up
in assuming a xed set of state probabilities. However in applications such as the
information models mentioned above and the contingent claim demand analysis
in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014), it is natural to suppose that probabilities can
vary. In this case, preferences need to be viewed as being dened on a set of con-
tingent claim spaces characterized by a set of state probabilities. Unfortunately
assuming Werners axioms hold on each contingent claim space does not ensure
that the NM index of the consumers state independent Expected Utility function
will be the same across the di¤erent spaces as probabilities change.
In this paper, we provide the additional axiomatic structure which is necessary
and su¢ cient to extend Werners analysis to the case where state probabilities
can vary and thereby avoid making the overly strong assumption that agents
possess preferences over the space of all possible probability distributions. One
key axiom we use to ensure that the NM index is unchanged (up to a positive a¢ ne
transform) across di¤erent contingent claim spaces is a modied version of Tradeo¤
Consistency introduced by Wakker (1989) in a SEU (Subjective Expected Utility)
setting. We require a modied version of this axiom, because for us probabilities
are exogenous, and not endogenous as in the SEU case.
One key aspect of preferences dened over the full set of contingent claim
spaces corresponding to di¤erent probability vectors, is that the consumer chooses
over consumption vectors, but never gets to choose over probabilities. This is in
contrast to the case where preferences dened over risk prospects or lotteries and
the decision maker can be viewed as choosing over both vectors of consumption
plans and probabilities. We provide the incremental axioms which are necessary
and su¢ cient to extend Expected Utility preferences with a non-changing NM
index to the space of risky prospects. For this case, a Certainty Uniqueness
axiom must be added. Alternatively, one can use a variation of the Werner axioms
and an axiom similar to Probabilistic Sophistication (introduced by Machina and
Schmeidler 1992 in a SEU setting).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we compare
and contrast the choice spaces and Expected Utility representations associated
with (i) contingent claims assuming a xed set of probabilities, (ii) contingent
claims assuming state probabilities vary as parameters and (iii) a set of probability
distributions or risky prospects corresponding to the case where both probabili-
ties and consumption vectors are choice variables. Section 3 develops the axiom
(1953) and Samuelson (1952) Expected Utility theorem. In the contingent claim setting, Ex-
pected Utility must be based on an alternative set of axioms.
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system for Expected Utility dened over contingent claims. First we review the
axioms for each contingent claim space conditioned on a xed set of probabilities.
Then we consider the set of axioms across di¤erent contingent claim spaces with
varying probabilities, which result in an Expected Utility representation which
is (i) characterized by the NM index being independent of probabilities and (ii)
consistent with the demand tests discussed in Kubler Selden and Wei (2014). In
Section 4, we identify the incremental set of axioms required to go from Expected
Utility preferences dened over a set of contingent claim spaces to Expected Util-
ity preferences dened over the space of distribution, where the number of states
is nite. Section 5 gives an example illustrating how a utility transformation
dependent on probabilities, which does not a¤ect contingent claim demands, can
radically alter the shape of indi¤erence curves in the Marschak-Machina probabil-
ity triangle. An Appendix is provided in which the indirect utility function used
for the Section 5 Example 4 is derived.
2 Di¤erent Preference Domains
Assume there are S states of nature and there is a single consumption good in each
state. A typical consumption plan is an S vector (c1; c2; :::; cS) in the consumption
space dened by RS+. We assume that probabilities are objective and known
and denote the probability of state s by s. Let  = (1; 2; :::; S), where
 2 S 1 = f 2 RS+ :
PS
s=1 s = 1g. Given this setting, we next dene three
di¤erent choices spaces which we will investigate.
The rst preference domain we consider corresponds to the classic Arrow-
Debreu contingent claim setup in which for each value of  2 S 1 a decision
maker is assumed to have complete, transitive and continuous preferences over
RS+ which is denoted . The second preference domain arises if one assumes
as in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) that the consumer confronts a sequence of
independent contingent claim optimizations where probabilities and prices vary.
Then corresponding to a set of probability vectors fg, there will be a set of
preference relations fg which need not be equivalent. The set of preference
orderings is assumed to be representable by a continuous and strictly increasing
utility function U (c;) : RS+ ! R, which is C1 in  and where the notation
U (c;) indicates that corresponding to each , there will be a potentially di¤erent
utility. It should be emphasized that for this set of utilities, the probability vector
 is allowed to change, but only as a parameter. One can view U (c;) as being
dened over a series of contingent claim spaces but not on their union. Therefore,
although we can use U (c;) to compare lotteries in each given contingent claim
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Figure 1:
space, it cannot be used to compare the lotteries across the di¤erent contingent
claim spaces. This is expressed geometrically in Figure 1, where two states are
assumed. Each shaded plane in the gure corresponds to a contingent claim
space with a given 1. Preferences on the planes corresponding to 01 and 
00
1 are
represented respectively by U(c;0) and U(c;00).
The third choice space we consider is the full set of distributions corresponding
to (c;), or the set of "risky prospects". To make this precise, dene a risky
prospect as a pair of vectors (c;) 2 RS+ S 1. Assume that a decision maker
has continuous, complete and transitive preferences over P = RS+S 1, denoted
P . For any xed  2 S 1 this implies preferences  are well dened. To
distinguish the representation of P from the representation of fg, we use
the notation U (c;) instead of U (c;). The former, in contrast to the latter,
has both c and  as arguments since one can compare lotteries across di¤erent
contingent claim spaces, or slices in Figure 1.
For each of the above three preferences cases, we provide in the next two
Sections a set of axioms that is necessary and su¢ cient for preferences to be
representable by an Expected Utility function. We next illustrate the di¤erence
in the resulting Expected Utilities using the following example2
U (c1; c2; c3; 1; 2; 3) =  1
3X
s=1
s (exp ( 1cs) + exp ( 2cs) + exp ( 3cs)) :
(1)
Note rst that if, as in the standard contingent claim case, probabilities are xed
at 1 = 0:5, 2 = 0:3 and 3 = 0:2 (dening a specic slice in Figure 1), eqn. (1)
2 This utility will be recognized to be a modied version of a representation discussed in
Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014).
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is equivalent up to a positive a¢ ne transformation to
U (c;) =  0:5 (exp ( 0:5c1) + exp ( 0:3c1) + exp ( 0:2c1))
 0:3 (exp ( 0:5c2) + exp ( 0:3c2) + exp ( 0:2c2))
 0:2 (exp ( 0:5c3) + exp ( 0:3c3) + exp ( 0:2c3)) : (2)
Moreover it can be veried that
@U=@c1
@U=@cs

c1=cs
=
1
s
(s = 2; 3) (3)
and the utility (2) passes the Expected Utility test in Dybvig (1983), implying
that it can be viewed as an Expected Utility when probabilities are xed and the
NM index is given by
v (c) =   (exp ( 0:5c) + exp ( 0:3c) + exp ( 0:2c)) : (4)
However when probabilities are allowed to vary and one considers preferences on
di¤erent contingent claim spaces, the resulting contingent claim demands cannot
pass the tests discussed in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014). The reason is that
when probabilities vary, the NM index associated with the utility (1) will also
change. In general, the kind of utility function in (1) takes the form
U(c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (5)
where f is increasing in its second argument and the NM index v is allowed to
depend on probabilities. It should be emphasized that for the utility (1), the NM
index
v(c) = exp ( 1c) + exp ( 2c) + exp ( 3c) (6)
depends on  but is state independent and thus is not denoted by vs;. The
notation f(; ) indicates that on each contingent claim slice corresponding to each
probability vector , one can consider a di¤erent increasing monotonic transform
of the Expected Utility
PS
s=1 sv(cs) and optimal contingent claim demands will
not be altered.
Next consider the utility function
U (c1; c2; c3; 1; 2; 3) =  1
3X
s=1
s (exp ( 0:5cs) + exp ( 0:3cs) + exp ( 0:2cs)) :
(7)
If one ignores the 1 in front, this is a standard Expected Utility with the same
NM index on each contingent claim slice
v (c) =   (exp ( 0:5c) + exp ( 0:3c) + exp ( 0:2c)) : (8)
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More generally, the utility (7) takes the form
U(c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (9)
where f continues to be increasing in its second argument but the NM index
v is independent of probabilities . Since (7) is an Expected Utility on each
contingent claim slice in Figure 1 and the NM index is the same on each slice, it
will result in demands that pass the tests in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014). From
observing optimal contingent claim demands, one can never distinguish ordinal
transformations in the utility function corresponding to f(; ). However when
considering comparisons over lotteries, the utility function dened in (7) (and
more generally (9)) cannot be viewed as an Expected Utility function. To see
this, consider the following two lotteries
L1 =< 1; 2; 3; 0:2; 0:3; 0:5 > and L2 =< 2; 1; 3; 0:3; 0:2; 0:5 >; (10)
where the payo¤s in L1 and L2, respectively, are given by 1; 2; 3 and 2; 1; 3 and
the probabilities by 0:2; 0:3; 0:5 and 0:3; 0:2; 0:5. Clearly for any Expected Utility
maximizer, L1 and L2 will be indi¤erent. However for the utility function (7)
since 1 = 0:2 for L1 and 1 = 0:3 for L2, we have
U (L1) < U (L2) : (11)
Hence from the lottery point of view, the transformation f(; x) = 1x a¤ects the
consumers choice whereas it does not in a demand optimization. Because of the
transformation, the probabilities do not enter into the utility function linearly and
(7) is not an Expected Utility function. The probability weighting function for
state i (i = 1; 2; 3) is 1i. From this perspective, this utility form can be viewed
as being more analogous to a Prospect Theory form (see Kahneman and Tversky
1979) than Expected Utility.
Finally for the third choice space where preferences over lotteries (for a nite
number of states S), P , are represented by an Expected Utility function, the
representation will take the form
U(c;) = f
 
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (12)
where f is independent of probabilities and increasing and the NM index v is
independent of probabilities. For instance in terms of the examples considered
above, U(c;) can take any monotone transform of
 
3X
s=1
s (exp ( 0:5cs) + exp ( 0:3cs) + exp ( 0:2cs)) : (13)
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Remark 1 The negative exponential utility function (1) is used in this section
to illustrates the di¤erent Expected Utility functions and respective preference do-
mains considered in this paper. However the reader may not nd the dependence of
the NM index on probabilities particularly intuitive. A perhaps more behaviorally
plausible example is given by the following
U (c;) = 1c
1
2
1 + 2c
1
2
2 + 3c
1
2
3 : (14)
Without loss of generality, we can always assume that the state s = 1 is associated
with the maximum consumption payo¤. In this case it would seem reasonable that
increasing the probability 1 of this best state would result in the consumer becoming
less risk averse. Computing the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for
the NM index, one obtains  cu00(c)=u0(c) = 1   1
2
. This is consistent with the
intuition  increasing 1 results in a decrease of the Arrow-Pratt measure. The
contingent claim demands, given a xed set of probabilities, generated by the utility
(14) will satisfy the Expected Utility test of Dybvig (1983), but across contingent
claim slices associated with varying probabilities the demands will not pass the
demand tests of Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014).
3 Preferences over Contingent Claims
In this section, we derive Expected Utility representations assuming preferences
are dened over a single or set of contingent claims spaces conditioned on state
probabilities. For the set of state probabilities S 1, suppose that the corre-
sponding set f g exists and is representable by U(c;). We rst give the rep-
resentation result over each contingent claim space, where  is specied. Then
we investigate the incremental axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient for the
Expected Utility representation for each preference relation in the set f g to
have the same NM index v, up to a positive a¢ ne transform, on each slice. We
compare and contrast axioms in our risky setting with related axioms in the SEU
setting.
3.1 Representation over Each Contingent Claim Space
In this subsection, we rst consider the standard contingent claim setting where
for each specic , U(c;) takes the state independent Expected Utility form as
in (5). We provide the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this to be the case.
Based on the SEU (Subjective Expected Utility) literature a natural candidate
axiom for U(c;) to become a state independent Expected Utility is the following
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version of the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom introduced by Wakker (1989).3
Axiom 1 (Tradeo¤ Consistency) For each  2 S 1, if c sx  c0 sy, c0 sw 
c sz and c000 s0y  c00 s0x, then c000 s0w  c00 s0z, where c sx denotes the consump-
tion vector c with consumption cs in state s replaced by x.
It follows from Wakker (1984, Lemmas 2.2 and 2.4) that Axiom 1 implies the
Sure-Thing Principle
c sx  c0 sx, c sy  c0 sy (15)
and the Thomsen-Blaschke condition when S = 2,
(c1; c2) s (c01; c02) ; (c1; c02) s (c01; c002) ; (c001; c02) s (c1; c002)) (c001; c2) s (c1; c002) :
(16)
Therefore Axiom 1 implies that the utility function is additively separable. How-
ever this axiom is not enough to ensure the existence of a state independent Ex-
pected Utility representation where the probabilities given exogenously as opposed
to endogenously determined in the SEU formulation. To derive the representation
result, we assume the following Risk Aversion axiom proposed by Werner (2005).4
Axiom 2 (Risk Aversion) For each  2 S 1 and a given c 2 RS+,
c  E (c) ; (17)
where E(c) denotes the S-vector c for which cs =
PS
i=1 ici for each s.
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 1 For each  2 S 1, U(c;) takes the following functional form5
U(c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (18)
3The SEU setting is considered in the seminal paper of Savage (1954) and further investigated
in an extensive literature including the important papers of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and
Wakker (1989). For a more complete discussion of the SEU framework and associated axioms,
see, for example, Wakker (1989), Nau (2011) and Karni (2013).
4The intuition for the Risk Aversion axiom is that a certain payo¤ is always preferred to
the uncertain payo¤ with the same mean. The surprising part is that with the assumption of
additive separability, this axiom ensures that probabilities enter into the utility function linearly.
5As noted in Section 2, U (c;) is assumed to be a strictly increasing function. This can
be guaranteed by the monotonicity of v and f in its second argument. Note that if v is
strictly decreasing and f is also strictly decreasing in its second argument, U (c;) is still a
strictly increasing function. But this case can be also achieved by assuming both to be strictly
increasing and thus it is ignored in Theorem 1. A similar argument holds as well for Theorems
2 - 4.
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where f is an arbitrary function that can depend on  and is strictly increasing
in its second argument and v is a strictly increasing and concave function, if and
only if Axioms 1 and 2 hold.
Proof. See Werner (2005) for the proof.
It will be noted that each NM index v is allowed to depend on probabilities.
This is consistent with the utility (1) discussed in Section 2, which takes the form
of U (c;) in Theorem 1. Indeed it can readily be veried that (1) satises
Axioms 1 and 2 for each given probability vector.
In the SEU setting, the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom by itself is necessary and
su¢ cient for a state independent Expected Utility representation. Why do we
need to also assume Axiom 2 in our setting? To answer this question, note that
in the SEU setting the state independent Expected Utility takes the form
U(c) =
SX
s=1
!sv(cs); (19)
where v(cs) is a state-independent utility function, unique up to a positive a¢ ne
transformation, and ! = (!1; !2; :::; !S) is a uniquely determined probability vec-
tor.6 However in our setting since probabilities are given exogenously and not
endogenously determined, the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom can not ensure the en-
dogenously determined ! matches the exogenously given . To see this more
explicitly, consider the following two examples. The rst one can be viewed as a
variant of a Prospect Theory representation and the second one can be viewed a
state dependent Expected Utility. Both examples satisfy Tradeo¤ Consistency.
Example 1 Assume that
U(c;) = 21v (c1) + 
2
2v (c2) + 
2
3v (c3) : (20)
Note that this representation can be viewed as
U(c) =
3X
s=1
!sv(cs); (21)
where
!s =
2s
21 + 
2
2 + 
2
3
: (22)
6Since the SEU axioms imply the existence of a v and a !, we use in (19) the notation U(c)
rather than U(c;!) to reect the fact that ! should not be viewed as a parameter that can be
changed like our exogenously given .
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Clearly the utility (20) satises Tradeo¤ Consistency and is a state independent
SEU function. Although the utility satises the state independence requirement
of Axiom 2, it does not satisfy the requirement that the probabilities enter into the
utility function linearly.
Example 2 Assume that
U(c;) = 1v (c1) + 22v (c2) + 33v (c3) : (23)
Note that (23) can be rewritten as the state independent SEU
U(c) =
3X
s=1
!sv(cs); (24)
where
!1 =
1
1 + 22 + 33
; !2 =
22
1 + 22 + 33
and !3 =
33
1 + 22 + 33
(25)
and (23) satises Tradeo¤ Consistency. However in our setting, the probability
vector  is exogenous and xed and cannot be transformed into !. To see this
implies that the utility (23) is not state independent, observe that it can be written
as
U(c;) =
3X
s=1
ssv(cs); (26)
where the NM index in each state is given by
vs(cs) = sv(cs); (27)
which is clearly state dependent and violates our Axiom 2. Thus, the Tradeo¤
Consistency axiom in the SEU setting does not imply state independence in our
setting, where probabilities are exogenous.
3.2 Representation over All Contingent Claim Spaces
Suppose rather than allowing the NM index v in Theorem 1 to vary as the state
probabilities change, one wants to ensure that the set of preference relations fg
are representable by a common state independent Expected Utility function across
contingent claim slices as in Figure 1. As shown in eqn. (1), even if U (c;) takes
the state independent Expected Utility form in each contingent claim space, it may
not be a state independent Expected Utility with respect to the set of preference
relations fg. Interestingly, this additional requirement can be achieved by
simply modifying the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom 1, which is applicable to our
setting of multiple slices and multiple probability vectors.
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Axiom 3 (Modied Tradeo¤ Consistency) For each  2 S 1, if c sx  c0 sy
and c0 sw  c sz then for any 0 2 S 1, if c000 s0y 0 c00 s0x, then c000 s0w 0
c00 s0z.
To provide some intuition for Axiom 3, assume S = 2 and consider the following
consumption pairs
c = c00 = (c1; 1) ; c0 = (c01; 0) and c
000 =

c1;
1
9

: (28)
Consider two contingent claim slices corresponding to
1 = 0:5 and 01 = 0:4 (29)
and the consumption values
x = 1; y = 4; w = 16; z = 9: (30)
Axiom 3 implies that if
(1; 1)  (4; 0) ; (9; 1)  (16; 0) and (1; 1) 0

4;
1
9

; (31)
then we must have
(9; 1) 0

16;
1
9

: (32)
This chain of indi¤erent consumption pairs is shown in Figure 2(a) and (b) re-
spectively, where we assume the Expected Utility representation
U (c;) = 1
p
c1 + 2
p
c2: (33)
Axiom 3 is clearly satised.7 In the SEU setting, since the probabilities are en-
dogenously determined, one only considers the case with a xed probability struc-
ture like Figure 2(a). Our contribution here is to assume Tradeo¤ Consistency
holds where the probability structure changes as in Figure 2(b).
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For all  2 S 1, U(c;) takes the following functional form
U (c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (34)
where f is an arbitrary function that can depend on  and is strictly increasing
in its second argument and v is a strictly increasing and concave function if and
only if Axioms 2 and 3 hold.
7It should be noted that Figure 2 is similar to Figure 4.5.1 in Kobberling and Wakker (2004).
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Figure 2:
Proof. Necessity is clear. Next prove su¢ ciency. Taking 0 = , it follows from
Theorem 1 that Axioms 3 and 2 imply that
U(c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
: (35)
Suppose that for  6= 0, we have c sx  c0 sy and c0 sw  c sz. Then
v (x)  v (y) = v (z)  v (w) : (36)
Similarly, c000 s0y 0 c00 s0x and c000 s0w 0 c00 s0z imply that
v0 (x)  v0 (y) = v0 (z)  v0 (w) : (37)
Since Axiom 3 implies that eqns. (36) and (37) hold for any x; y; z; w, v and v0
must be a¢ nely equivalent. Therefore, for any  6= 0 2 S 1, we must have
v = av0 + b; (38)
where a > 0 and b are some constants. Since the NM index is dened up to an
a¢ ne transformation, we can conclude that
U(c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (39)
which completes the proof.
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4 Preferences over Lotteries
In the previous section preferences were assumed to be dened over contingent
consumption, and probabilities entered only as parameters. However suppose
instead that a decision maker faces choices over di¤erent "risky prospects" or
lotteries, which are dened as vectors (c; ) 2 RS+  S 1. As described in
Section 2, we assume a continuous, complete and transitive preference ordering
over P = RS+S 1 denoted by P . In this section, we consider what additional
axioms beyond those in Theorem 2 are required to extend the state independent
Expected Utility representation of fg to P . Maintaining Axioms 2 and 3, the
following turns out to be necessary and su¢ cient.
Axiom 4 (Certainty Uniqueness) For any certain consumption c = (c1; c2; :::; cS),
where cs = c is a constant for each state s,
(c;) P (c;0) 8;0 2 S 1: (40)
Axiom 4 assumes that the decision maker is indi¤erent between the same cer-
tain consumption vector on di¤erent contingent claim spaces parameterized by
di¤erent probability vectors. In terms of Figure 1, this corresponds to being
indi¤erent to the same c point along the 45 rays on the slices corresponding to
0 and 00. Based on Axiom 4, we assume throughout this section that for any
certain consumption vectors c = (c1; c2; :::; cS) and c0 = (c01; c
0
2; :::; c
0
S) where cs = c
and c0s = c
0 (8s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg) and for any ;0 2 S 1, (c;) P (c0;0) if and
only if c  c0.
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 U(c;) representing P takes the following functional form
U (c;) = f
 
SX
s=1
sv (cs)
!
; (41)
where f is a strictly increasing function independent of probabilities and v is a
strictly increasing and concave function if and only if Axioms 2, 3 and 4 hold.
Proof. Necessity is obvious. Next we prove su¢ ciency. It follows from Theorem
2 that Axioms 2 and 3 are equivalent to a utility representation of the form
U (c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
; (42)
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where v(cs) is a strictly increasing and concave function. It follows from Axiom
4 that 8c = (c; c; :::; c) 2 RS+ and 8;0 2 S 1, we have
f (; v (c)) = f (0; v (c)) ; (43)
implying that f(; ) must be independent of probabilities.
Comparing the representations (34) and (41) in Theorems 2 and 3, respectively,
Axiom 4 is necessary and su¢ cient for the transformation f to be independent
of . For example, the introduction of Axiom 4 rules out eqn. (1) in Section
2 as a possible representation of P . It should be stressed that the form of
utility in Theorem 3 is not veriable at the demand level since whether or not
the transformation f depends on probabilities cannot be determined from the
contingent claim demand functions.
It is natural to wonder whether it is enough to use the Tradeo¤ Consistency
Axiom 1 instead of the modied version Axiom 3 together with Axioms 2 and 4 to
obtain the desired result in Theorem 3. Unfortunately as the following example
shows, this is not the case.
Example 3 Assume that
U (c;) = f
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
=

1c
1
2
1 + 2c
1
2
2 + 3c
1
2
3
 1
1
; (44)
where
v (cs) = c
1
2
s and f (; x) = x
1
1 : (45)
If consumption in each of the states is the same, cs = c, then
U (c;) =

1c
1
2 + 2c
1
2 + 3c
1
2
 1
1 =
p
c; (46)
which is independent of probabilities and hence Axiom 4 holds. For each xed
probability , (44) is clearly a state independent Expected Utility. Therefore,
Axioms 2 and 1 hold. But obviously (44) does not take the form of (41) in
Theorem 3.
Assuming Axioms 2 and 1 hold, is it possible to replace Axiom 4 by another
axiom which ensures that U takes the form in (41)? Before introducing a new
axiom, we dene some additional notation. For any (c;), where  2 S 1,
assuming (c;) corresponds to the random variableX, the cumulative distribution
function is
FX (z) =
SX
s=1
sI (cs  z) ; (47)
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where
I (cs  z) =
(
1 (cs  z)
0 (cs > z)
: (48)
Axiom 5 For any pair of random variables X and Y corresponding, respectively,
to (c;) and (c0;0), where ;0 2 S 1, if FX (z) = FY (z), then
(c;) P (c0;0) : (49)
The intuition for this axiom is that for any pair of lotteries dened on di¤erent
contingent claim spaces, if their respective cumulative distribution functions are
the same, then the lotteries will be indi¤erent. This is consistent with both the
NM index v and the transformation f being independent of . It is clear that
Axiom 5 implies Axiom 4.
Remark 2 Axiom 5 will be recognized to be similar to the probabilistic sophisti-
cation property introduced by Machina and Schmeidler (1992) in an SEU setting
(also see Grant, Özsoy and Polak 2008). Because this property is based on subjec-
tive probabilities, it is necessary to introduce axiomatic structure to ensure that the
endogenous probabilities satisfy probabilistic sophistication. However in the case
of Axiom 5, the probabilities are given exogenously and the axiom can be directly
assumed.
We next show that Axiom 5 together with Axioms 2 and 1 are necessary and
su¢ cient for P to be representable by a state independent Expected Utility
function where the NM index does not depend on probabilities in contrast to the
case of Example 3.
Theorem 4 When S > 2, U(c;) representing P takes the following functional
form
U (c;) = f
 
SX
s=1
sv (cs)
!
; (50)
where f is a strictly increasing function independent of probabilities and v is a
strictly increasing and concave function if and only if Axioms 1, 2 and 5 hold.
Proof. Necessity is obvious. Next we prove su¢ ciency. It follows from Theorem
1 that Axioms 2 and 1 are equivalent to a utility representation of the form
U (c;) = g
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
: (51)
16
Axiom 5 implies that
U(c;) = g (; v(c)) (52)
is independent of probabilities. Assume that
g (v(c)) = f (c) ; (53)
where f is independent of probabilities. It follows that 8c
g (c) = g
 
v  v 1 (c)

= f  v 1 (c) ; (54)
implying that
g = f  v 1 : (55)
If c1 6= c2 = c3 = ::: = cS = c then it follows from Axiom 5 that
U(c;) = f  v 1 ((1  1) v(c) + 1v(c1)) (56)
is independent of s (s > 1), or equivalently,
@v 1 ((1  1) v(c) + 1v(c1))
@s
= 0 (8s = 2; 3; :::; S) : (57)
Holding 1 xed, consider two di¤erent proles of probabilities  and 0 with
associated NM indices v and v0 . It follows from (57) that there exists a (c1; c)
such that
(c1; c) = v
 1
 ((1  1) v(c) + 1v(c1)) (58)
and
(c1; c) = v
 1
0 ((1  1) v0(c) + 1v0(c1)) ; (59)
implying that
v ((c1; c)) = (1  1) v(c) + 1v(c1) (60)
and
v0 ((c1; c)) = (1  1) v0(c) + 1v0(c1): (61)
Therefore,
v ((c1; c))) = h(v0 ((c1; c)))
= 1h(v0(c1)) + (1  1)h(v0(c))
= h ((1  1) v0(c) + 1v0(c1)) : (62)
Since eqn. (62) holds for any given 1, c1 and c, we can conclude that h is a linear
function which can depend on s and 0s (s = 2; 3; :::; S). Since 8;0 2 S 1
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with the same 1, there always exists a linear function h;0 () such that v(c) =
h;0(v0(c)), we can conclude that
v(c) = 
0
1 (1; 2; :::; S 1) v1 (c) + 
0
2 (1; 2; :::; S 1) (8c) ; (63)
where 01 and 
0
2 are some arbitrary coe¢ cients. Assuming c2 6= c1 = c3 = ::: =
cS = c and following the similar argument, we can also show that
v(c) = 
00
1 (1; 2; :::; S 1) v2 (c) + 
00
2 (1; 2; :::; S 1) (8c) ; (64)
where 001 and 
00
2 are some arbitrary coe¢ cients. Combining eqn. (63) with (64)
yields
v(c) = 1 (1; 2; :::; S 1) v (c) + 2 (1; 2; :::; S 1) (8c) ; (65)
where 1 and 2 are some arbitrary coe¢ cients and v is independent of probabil-
ities. Therefore we have
U(c;) = g
 
;
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
= f  v 1
 
SX
s=1
sv(cs)
!
= f
 
SX
s=1
sv (cs)
!
:
(66)
Remark 3 We can compare the conditions in Theorems 3 and 4. For Theorem 3,
although the Certainty Uniqueness axiom is easy to test, one needs to consider the
modied Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom. That means one needs to verify whether the
Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom holds on di¤erent contingent claim spaces as shown
in Figure 2, which is complicated in general. For Theorem 4, one just needs to
consider the traditional Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom and Axiom 5. In principle
to conduct a laboratory test based on Theorem 4 is easier than based on Theorem
3. However, it should be noted that Theorem 4 only works for the S > 2 case
since Axiom 5 converges to Axiom 4 when S = 2. Therefore, if there are only
two states, one has no choice but use Theorem 3.
Finally, it is natural to inquire into the relationship between Theorem 4 and
the conventional Expected Utility representation result based on the Strong Inde-
pendence axiom (e.g., Samuelson 1952 and Grandmont 1972). First let F denote
the set of all cumulative distribution functions dened on the consumption space
(0;1). Assume preferences are dened over F , which is a mixture space. Since
F consists all possible distributions, it is not restricted to S states. However, it
can be easily seen that (50) is also the Expected Utility representation over F , if
one restricts the number of the lottery states to be less than or equal to S. Indeed
the Strong Independence axiom typically assumed for preferences over F holds for
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any mixture of lotteries where the maximum number of states of the lotteries is
S. Therefore, the only di¤erence between the set of risk prospects P assumed in
this section and F is that for the former the number of the states are xed at S
and for F , there is no restriction to the number of states.
5 Marschak-Machina Triangle
As noted above, although probability dependent transformations of state indepen-
dent Expected Utility functions will not alter contingent claim demand behavior,
they do change the consumers preferences over lotteries. To see the implica-
tions of this, we consider in this section an example which utilizes the probability
simplex proposed by Marschak (1950) and extended by Machina (1982) (often
referred to as the MM (Marschak-Machina) triangle). It should be noted that in
any given MM triangle, the payo¤ cs (s = 1; 2; 3) on each vertex is xed and each
point in the triangle corresponds to a di¤erent probability vector. We follow the
convention of associating the largest, middle and smallest values of cs with the
northern, southeastern and southwestern vertices of the triangle, respectively.
Example 4 Assume the following demand functions
c1 =
0B@ 1
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
 1
1+1 + p3

3p1
1p3
 1
1+1
+
1
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
 1
1+2 + p3

3p1
1p3
 1
1+2
1CA I
2
;
(67)
c2 =
0B@

2p1
1p2
 1
1+1
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
 1
1+1 + p3

3p1
1p3
 1
1+1
+

2p1
1p2
 1
1+2
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
 1
1+2 + p3

3p1
1p3
 1
1+2
1CA I
2
(68)
and
c3 =
0B@

3p1
1p3
 1
1+1
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
 1
1+1 + p3

3p1
1p3
 1
1+1
+

3p1
1p3
 1
1+2
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
 1
1+2 + p3

3p1
1p3
 1
1+2
1CA I
2
;
(69)
where 1 6= 2 >  1. These demands are well-behaved in the sense that the asso-
ciated Slutsky matrix is negative semidenite and symmetric, implying that (67) -
(69) are consistent with the maximization of a quasiconcave utility function sub-
ject to the standard contingent claim budget constraint. They exhibit normal good
behavior and since each demand is linear in income, the underlying preferences
are homothetic. However, the system of equations (67) - (69) does not satisfy the
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demand tests in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) for preferences to be represented
by an Expected Utility function and hence the corresponding utility U(x;) does
not take the Expected Utility form in Theorem 2. Then what is the form of the
utility generating these well-behaved demands? Denoting
q1 =
p1
p3
; q2 =
p2
p3
and m =
I
p3
(70)
and assuming 1 =  12 and 2 = 0, we obtain the following demands
c1 =
0@ 21
21q1 +
22q
2
1
q2
+ 23q
2
1
+
1
q1
1A m
2
; (71)
c2 =
0@ 22q1q22
21 +
22q1
q2
+ 23q1
+
2
q2
1A m
2
(72)
and
c3 =
0@ 23q1
21 +
22q1
q2
+ 23q1
+ 3
1A m
2
; (73)
and the indirect utility function8
V (q1; q2;m) =
m
r
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
2
+

3q1
1
2
q
1+ 1
2
1
1
: (74)
(See the Appendix for the general derivation in terms of 1 and 2.) To generate an
indi¤erence curve in the MM triangle, one can x a set of values corresponding to
(V; c1; c2; c3) and then solve for the set (q1; q2;m; 3) when changing 1. In Figure
3, we x (c1; c2; c3) = (1; 2; 3) and draw two indi¤erence curves corresponding
to V = 6 (green curve) and V = 7 (red curve), respectively. The shape of the
indi¤erence curves clearly do not take the linear form associated with Expected
Utility preferences. For general preferences over lotteries, it is standard to assume
that preferences satisfy rst-order stochastic dominance property. This condition
requires that for any two random variables X and Y , if FX (z)  FY (z), then X
is always preferred to Y . It is clear that rst-order stochastic dominance implies
our Axiom 4 (and hence Axiom 5). In the MM triangle, rst-order stochastic
dominance condition suggests the indi¤erence cannot bend back as in Figure 3.
(Graphically, if X rst-order stochastic dominates Y , X lies to the northwest of
Y in the MM triangle.) Therefore for preferences corresponding to the indirect
8Despite the relatively simple form of the demand functions, it is not possible to obtain an
analytical expression for U(x;).
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Figure 3:
utility eqn. (74), rst-order stochastic dominance condition is violated.9 To see
that the utility corresponding to (74) also violates Axioms 4 and 5, observe that
c1 = c2 = c3 = c implies that
q1 =
1
3
; q2 =
2
3
and m =
p1c+ p2c+ p3c
p3
=
c
3
; (75)
and10
U jc1=c2=c3=c =
c
3
q
1
3
+ 2
3
+ 1
1
3
1+ 1
2
1
=
c

1+ 1
2
1
1 
1
2
  1
2
1
3
: (76)
Clearly the value of U jc1=c2=c3=c depends on the probabilities. It is natural to won-
der whether there exists some transformation f to make the representation satisfy
Axiom 4. And if this is possible, how will the transformation a¤ect the shape of
the indi¤erence curves in the MM triangle? In order to make U jc1=c2=c3=c inde-
pendent of the probabilities and satisfy Axiom 4, one can apply the transformation
f  U = 1+
1
2
1
1 
1
2
  1
2
1
3 U: (77)
9See Camerer and Ho (1994) for a more detailed discussion and illustration of indi¤erence
curve properties in the MM triangle.
10Noting that the direct utility function U and the indirect utility function V only di¤er in
arguments, we can use the form of the indirect utility function to get the direct utility function
when c1 = c2 = c3.
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Using f, the indirect utility function dened in (74) can be transformed into
V = 
1+ 1
2
1
1 
1
2
  1
2
1
3
m
r
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
2
+

3q1
1
2
q
1+ 1
2
1
1
: (78)
Fixing (c1; c2; c3) = (1; 2; 3), we plot the indi¤erence curves corresponding to (78)
in Figure 4. It is clear that the indi¤erence curves are very close to parallel
lines corresponding to the Expected Utility case and hence rst-order stochastic
dominance property appears to hold. Thus corresponding to the demand system
(67)-(69), it possible to have the two very di¤erent sets of indi¤erence curves
plotted in Figures 3 and 4.
It is clear from the discussion of the example in this section that preference
properties such as rst order stochastic dominance relating to the shape of the in-
di¤erence curves in the MM triangle fail to be distinguishable at the corresponding
contingent claim demand level. In fact, the set of lotteries in the MM triangle
can be viewed as orthogonal to the set of lotteries in the contingent claims spaces
parameterized by . In the contingent claim space, since the probabilities are
xed, any transformation based on probabilities f will not change the shape of
the indi¤erence curves. Similarly, in the MM triangle, since the payo¤s are xed,
a transformation based on consumption values denoted by fc will not change the
shape of the indi¤erence curves. But it is obvious that both the transformation
f and fc will a¤ect general lottery comparisons in P. The relationship between
preferences dened on these three spaces and the corresponding transformations
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Figure 5:
is summarized in Figure 5. It follows, as suggested by the Figure, that the exis-
tence of an Expected Utility representation for lotteries dened in the contingent
claim space cannot ensure an Expected Utility representation over lotteries cor-
responding to the MM triangle and vice versa. However, if the preferences over
lotteries in P are Expected Utility representable, taking the form in eqn. (50),
then the ordering will be Expected Utility representable for lotteries dened in
the contingent claim space and the MM triangle.
Appendix
A Indirect Utility Function for General 1 and
2
In this appendix, we derive the indirect utility function that generates the demand
functions in eqns. (67)-(69). Denoting
q1 =
p1
p3
; q2 =
p2
p3
and m =
I
p3
(79)
and letting (p) denote the income compensation function, we have
@ ln
@q1
=
0B@ 1
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1 +

3q1
1
 1
1+1
+
1
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+2 +

3q1
1
 1
1+2
1CA 1
2
(80)
and
@ ln
@q2
=
0B@

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1 +

3q1
1
 1
1+1
+

2q1
1q2
 1
1+2
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+2 +

3q1
1
 1
1+2
1CA 1
2
:
(81)
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It can be veried that
@2 ln
@q1@q2
=
@2 ln
@q2@q1
: (82)
Therefore the equation system (80)-(81) has a unique solution and we can simply
integrate (80) to obtain the solution. If 12 6= 0, integrating (80) yields
ln =
2 (1 + 1) ln

q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1 +

3q1
1
 1
1+1

212
+
1 (1 + 2) ln

q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+2 +

3q1
1
 1
1+2

212
 (1 + 2) ln q1
212
+ C: (83)
Therefore, we have
 = K
 
q
1
1+1
1 + q2

2
1q2
 1
1+1
+

3
1
 1
1+1
! 1+1
21

 
q
2
1+2
1 + q2

2
1q2
 1
1+2
+

3
1
 1
1+2
! 1+2
22
: (84)
The indirect utility function is given by
V (q1; q2;m) =
m
q
1
1+1
1 + q2

2
1q2
 1
1+1 +

3
1
 1
1+1
 1+1
21
 1
q
2
1+2
1 + q2

2
1q2
 1
1+2 +

3
1
 1
1+2
 1+2
22
: (85)
If 12 = 0, since we consider the case when 1 6= 2, without loss of generality, we
assume that 2 = 0 and then
ln =
11 ln q1 + (1 + 1) ln

q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1 +

3q1
1
 1
1+1

  ln q1
21
+ C:
(86)
Therefore, we have
 = K
 
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1
+

3q1
1
 1
1+1
! 1+1
21
q
11 1
21
1 : (87)
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The indirect utility function is given by
V (q1; q2;m) =
m
q1 + q2

2q1
1q2
 1
1+1 +

3q1
1
 1
1+1
 1+1
21
q
11 1
21
1
: (88)
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